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Hello 0-Days, My Old Friend: A 2024 Zero-Day Exploitation Analysis

3. Ad-hoc Security: Implemented in WPTaskScheduler.dll::CallerHasAccess and called prior to enabling or executing any scheduled task. The function performs checks on whether the calling user is attempting to execute a task created by them or one they should be able to access but does not perform any additional checks to prevent calls originating from an unprivileged user.

CVE-2024-49039 addresses the issue by applying a more restrictive ACL to the interface; however, the issue with the less secure endpoint described in "1. Securing the endpoint" remains, and a restricted token process is still able to access the endpoint.

Unidentified Actor Using the Same Exploits


In addition to CIGAR, we discovered another, likely financially motivated, group using the exact same exploits (albeit with a different payload) while CVE-2024-49039 was still a zero-day. This actor utilized a watering hole on a legitimate, compromised cryptocurrency news website redirecting to an attacker-controlled domain hosting the same CVE-2024-9680 and CVE-2024-49039 exploit.

Outlook and Implications


Defending against zero-day exploitation continues to be a race of strategy and prioritization. Not only are zero-day vulnerabilities becoming easier to procure, but attackers finding use in new types of technology may strain less experienced vendors. While organizations have historically been left to prioritize patching processes based on personal or organizational threats and attack surfaces, broader trends can inform a more specific approach alongside lessons learned from major vendors' mitigation efforts.

We expect zero-day vulnerabilities to maintain their allure to threat actors as opportunities for stealth, persistence, and detection evasion. While we observed trends regarding improved vendor security posture and decreasing numbers around certain historically popular products particularly mobile and browsers we anticipate that zero-day exploitation will continue to rise steadily. Given the ubiquity of operating systems and browsers in daily use, big tech vendors are consistently high-interest targets, and we expect this to continue. Phones and browsers will almost certainly remain popular targets, although enterprise software and appliances will likely see a continued rise in zero-day exploitation. Big tech companies have been victims of zero-day exploitation before and will continue to be targeted. This experience, in addition to the resources required to build more secure products and detect vulnerabilities in responsible manners, permits larger companies to approach zero-days as a more manageable problem.

For newly targeted vendors and those with products in the growing prevalence of targeted enterprise products, security practices and procedures should evolve to consider how successful exploitation of these products could bypass typical protection mechanisms. Preventing successful exploitation will rely heavily on these vendors' abilities to enforce proper and safe coding practices. We continue to see the same types of vulnerabilities exploited over time, indicating patterns in what weaknesses attackers seek out and find most beneficial to exploit. Continued existence and exploitation of similar issues makes zero-days easier; threat actors know what to look for and where exploitable weaknesses are most pervasive.

Vendors should account for this shift in threat activity and address gaps in configurations and architectural decisions that could permit exploitation of a single product to cause irreparable damage. This is especially true for highly valuable tools with administrator access and/or widespread reach across systems and networks. Best practices continue to represent a minimum threshold of what security standards an architecture should demonstrate, including zero-trust fundamentals such as least-privilege access and network segmentation. Continuous monitoring should occur where possible in order to restrict and end unauthorized access as swiftly as possible, and vendors will need to account for EDR capabilities for technologies that currently lack them (e.g., many security and networking products). GTIG recommends acute threat surface awareness and respective due diligence in order to defend against today's zero-day threat landscape. Zero-day exploitation will ultimately be dictated by vendors' decisions and ability to counter threat actors' objectives and pursuits.



Published: 2025-04-29T05:00:00











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